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Legal Activism on the Rise
Western society faces increasingly complex
governance challenges.1 Despite growing recognition that
we need to take and act on a longer-term view, the incentives
for myopic leadership and action remain strong. Our
willingness to control activities that have negative externalities
has been limited by uncertainty about future costs and, more
importantly, by a lack of incentives to price and allocate
such costs equitably.
There is little question as to the trajectory of the law: by
choice, by chance, or by default, it is increasingly responding
to “reasonable expectations.” To the extent that legislators are
unable or unwilling to do so, our courts and other adjudicative
tribunals have demonstrated a willingness to step in.
The regulation of corporate conduct offers a case in point.
A series of decisions by courts and regulators released in recent
years have held parent companies responsible for the liabilities
and misconduct of their subsidiaries, notwithstanding the
general principle that shareholders are not responsible for the
liabilities of corporations.2 In these cases, the public interest in
discouraging excessive risk taking and other harmful conduct
was found to outweigh the benefits of protecting shareholders
from liability.
This article focuses on similar trends in the financial sector,
a sector that is critical to ensuring future well-being but in
which increasing complexity in financial flows, instruments,
and regulation has exacerbated informational asymmetries,
eroded institutional cultures, and confounded traditional
regulatory frameworks, often to the detriment of consumers
and of society in general (see Hu 2012; Sah, Loewenstein,
and Cain 2013; Haldane and Madouros 2012; see also Zingales
2012). We begin by providing several recent reference points,
designed to illustrate the trajectory of the law and the increasing
velocity and intensity of regulatory reform.
A Likely Inflection Point
Several recent examples of institutional dysfunction, and
the consequent regulatory responses, suggest that we have
likely reached an inflection point. In none of these examples
are the highest echelons of these institutions clearly implicated
in any wrongdoing, and the behavior involved may not even
have been technically illegal. The problem was that these
institutions focused on doing things “right,” on technical
compliance with whatever legal rules existed at the time,
rather than on doing the right thing; as a result, they engaged
in conduct that was technically legal but unfair to market
participants. We argue that regulatory responses to this conduct
– increasingly punitive sanctions, justified on the basis of
fairness – should lead institutions to rethink their assumptions
about the purpose the financial sector is intended to serve and
about how best to respond to the norm of reasonable public
expectations.
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Informational asymmetries, misaligned incentives, and artificially elongated
chains of intermediation have created a disconnect between the financial sector
and the real economy that is detrimental to the public interest. Courts and
regulators are increasingly intervening to break the cycle. Fiduciary law offers
a conceptual framework both for understanding and responding to this trend.
This article argues that the financial sector, rather than waiting for this trend
to develop and reacting to new rules in a piecemeal way, should be proactive
and shape the way in which the trend develops.
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Here are six examples:
1. Foreign exchange market manipulation: Regulators in
several jurisdictions are investigating alleged manipulation
of the US$5.3-trillion-per-day foreign exchange market.
The allegations involve collusion among traders to fix
benchmark exchange rates in their favor, resulting in
higher costs for consumers. In a market this large, even
a scheme that skims fractional amounts translates into
billions of dollars. The fact that traders’ bonuses are
based on trading profits gives them reason to collude,
especially in the absence of transparent markets or
strong oversight.
2. Mortgage misrepresentation: Since 2009, the largest
American banks3 have paid out or set aside more than
US$45 billion for mortgage misrepresentation issues and
have incurred roughly US$50 billion in combined legal
expenses (S&P 2013, 2). Standard & Poor’s estimates that
between US$55 billion and US$105 billion may have to
be paid out to settle mortgage-related issues (S&P 2013, 2).
In 2013 alone, JP Morgan paid out regulatory penalties
of US$20 billion on matters ranging from mortgage
misrepresentations to failing to report Bernard Madoff’s
suspicious activities to the authorities. Many believe that
this institution, and others like it, have become so large
and complex that it may be impossible to keep employees
in line. According to one analyst, “there is too much of an
incentive for an individual to cut corners” (Eavis 2014,
quoting Paul Miller, a bank analyst at FBR Capital Markets).
3. High-frequency trading, including the early release of
market information to high-frequency traders, is another area
where we can expect new rules to emerge. In July 2013,
Thomson Reuters suspended the practice of selling market-
moving data to high-frequency algorithmic traders up to 2
seconds ahead of making it available to other subscribers.
This was in response to an investigation launched by the
New York State Attorney General’s office based on a
whistleblower complaint. There was no allegation of
conventional illegality; indeed, Thomson Reuters insisted
that it had the right to “legally distribute non-governmental
data” to “fee-paying subscribers” (Taibbi 2013).4
4. Other unfair informational advantage practices: BlackRock,
the world’s largest asset management company, recently
entered into a settlement with the New York Attorney
General to end its practice of surveying Wall Street analysts
before public dissemination of their research reports. The
firm also paid US$400,000 to cover investigation costs.
In a January 2014 press release, Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman called BlackRock’s decision to end this
practice “a major step forward in restoring fairness in our
financial markets and ensuring a level playing field for
all investors.”5
5. Disregarding professional standards: The UK Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) recently invoked new sanction
powers to issue a “severe reprimand” and a £14 million
fine against Deloitte for “placing their own interests ahead
of the public” and compromising their own objectivity
“in flagrant disregard of the professional standards expected
and required” (FRC v Deloitte and Einollahi (2013), paras.
200, 270).6 The case arose out of corporate finance advice
provided by Deloitte on the sale of MG Rover. While the
ethics rules of the United Kingdom’s professional accounting
body require accountants to consider the public interest, the
traditional view was that this applied only with respect to
audit mandates (ICAEW 2013, paras. 1.2, 100.1; see also
Irvine 2013). The tribunal explicitly rejected the notion that
in corporate finance and tax work, the firm’s only duty is
to its client (Deloitte 2013, para. 42).
6. Failure to control investor costs: The United Kingdom’s
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) raised concerns about several
older defined contribution (DC) plans, in which as many as
190,000 savers were thought to be paying 1% or more in
annual charges (as opposed to the “new wave” of DC plans,
in which charges tend to be half that amount) (OFT 2013,
paras. 6.42–6.51, 9.58; see also Columbo 2013).7 The study
also highlighted the lack of trustee competence and poor
governance in 3,000 smaller pension schemes (OFT 2013,
para. 9.25). In response to the study, the Association of
British Insurers (ABI) immediately agreed to conduct an
audit of the older plans (OFT 2013, para. 9.22; ABI 2013).
These examples make clear that “doing it right” is no longer
enough. Regulators, courts, and legislators that find fairness
problems in financial markets will intervene, often with
punitive sanctions. The question is whether there is a way of
understanding this pattern, predicting its future course, and
prescribing conduct that avoids further sanctions. Fiduciary
law offers an answer to these questions.
Evolving Fiduciary Standards in the
Financial Sector
In an increasingly complex world, individuals need to trust
that the specialists they retain will keep their best interests
at heart (Frankel 1983). Fiduciary law aims to promote this
trust (Flannigan 1989, 310; Mitchell 1997, 480). It applies to
relationships in which one party gains discretionary power
over another in circumstances under which both parties would
“reasonably expect” that the fiduciary will exercise power in
the best interests of the beneficiary.8 Fiduciary law imposes
a standard of conduct higher than that normally found in the
marketplace by subjecting the fiduciary to well-established
duties of loyalty, obedience, and care, which, in combination,
oblige the fiduciary to act prudently in the best interests of
the beneficiary.
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In setting out new norms to govern the financial sector,
legislators, regulators, and courts are relying on a broader
view of the duty of loyalty imposed on fiduciaries, one no
longer limited to disclosing or avoiding conflicts of interest.
Disclosure has been shown to be, at best, an imperfect tool
for managing conflicts (Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore 2005).
While avoiding conflicts is a necessary step toward reinforcing
trust in financial markets, it is not sufficient.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on the duty of
loyalty offers the clearest outline of how this view works in
practice. In the 2008 case BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders,
the Court reviewed a claim by bondholders who alleged that
the Board of BCE Inc. had not adequately considered their
interests before agreeing to a change of control transaction.
The Court, upholding the Board’s decision, held that the Board,
in executing its duty of loyalty to the corporation, was required
to reflect on the interests of the corporation both as an economic
actor and as a “good corporate citizen” (BCE, para. 66). The
Court added that, in doing so, directors could legitimately
consider not only the interests of shareholders and creditors
but also broader social interests (BCE, para. 40).
In addition, the duty of impartiality requires fiduciaries to
consider and balance the divergent interests of beneficiaries.9
Fiduciaries charged with managing and advising investment
vehicles that encompass multiple generations of beneficiaries
(e.g., defined benefit pension plans) must therefore consider the
intergenerational implications of their decisions (or advice),10
which imports the principle of intergenerational equity into the
duty of loyalty.11 These obligations reflect the social purpose
of fiduciary obligations and the importance of public trust and
confidence to the continued vitality of these services.
In determining what is required to accomplish these goals,
we can benefit from considering the definition of the duty of
loyalty adopted in the American “public trust doctrine,” which
starts from the premise that social and economic progress
depend on a common infrastructure the preservation of which
for future generations is a vital public goal. While the present
generation is entitled to reasonable use of these resources,
any use that interferes with the rights of future generations is
prohibited (Wood 2009a, 2009b). This principle lies at the heart
of the definition of fiduciary duty, which is to preserve assets
entrusted to the fiduciary. If one thinks of asset preservation as
protection from inflation, it is but a small step to take a more
systemic view – including protection from a degenerating
environment or society.
The same logic is readily applied to the financial sector.
Economic actors rely on a common infrastructure; their economic
success is predicated on, among other things, equitable access
to capital markets, adherence to sound governance principles;
a natural environment capable of sustaining their operations;
an education system that prepares the potential labour base for
the workforce; and a stable, equitable economy capable of
sustaining a strong consumer base for their products or services.
If this infrastructure is allowed to fail, the resulting losses will
be passed on to investors, both present and future. Thus, the duty
of loyalty, as it is increasingly envisioned by courts, regulators,
and legislators, imposes a similar resulting obligation on financial
actors to preserve and continue to develop this infrastructure,
as well as their own, for the public good.
Five Proactive Initiatives
In what follows we set out five initiatives that financial institutions
could undertake to take into account these expectations and
responsibilities, and discuss ways in which regulators and
legislators can encourage institutions to embrace them. All
reflect a call for a shift in emphasis from reactive regulatory
and compliance strategies to proactive ones. Rather than
following “check-box” compliance to regulation, institutions
should anticipate future risks and consider how best to respond
to them. Regulators, in turn, should shift from a strategy of
imposing detailed, complex rules in response to past failures
to strategies that compel institutions to think about and mitigate
emerging long-term and systemic risks.
1. Rethink fiduciary duties. The fiduciary of the future will
recognize and follow through on responsibilities to preserve
and support the institutional system in which the fiduciary
is embedded, including a duty to ensure that externalities
are properly priced and moral failures are addressed
(Henderson and Ramanna 2013). This will require a shift
away from the zero-sum perspective that for a financial
institution to “win,” the client must “lose,” and toward a
fiduciary culture with a clearly articulated and generally
accepted public purpose.12 The ten “Investment Beliefs”
adopted by CalPERS (2013) offer an example of how
behavioral standards reflecting such a fiduciary culture
can be expressed in a pension fund context; similar
standards should be adopted throughout the financial
sector. Enforcement of these standards should take the
form of rewards, the most powerful being advancement
in the organization. If pay for performance is retained
as an incentive, it should be oriented toward long-term
performance and explicitly engineered to reward
stewardship and a commitment to sustainability.
2. Foster “win/win” collaborations. A “trust dilemma” is a
situation in which the short-term benefits of not acting until
someone else steps up outweigh the short-term benefits of
being the first to take action (Gilson and Gordon 2013). The
way out of such a dilemma is for multiple parties to agree
to share the costs. Such collaborations drive more efficient
and resilient use of resources. Existing investor coalitions
30 Volume 7 • Issue 2 • Fall 2014
Rotman International Journal
of Pension Management
Volume 7 • Issue 2
Fall 2014
R e c o n n e c t i n g t h e F i n a n c i a l S e c t o r t o t h e R e a l E c o n o m y : A P l a n f o r A c t i o n
31Volume 7 • Issue 2 • Fall 2014
such as the International Corporate Governance Network,
the United States–based Council of Institutional Investors,
and the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance have
produced thoughtful proposals for governance reforms
and used their collective suasion to effect meaningful
changes in regulation and behavior. Even more can be done
through collaboration between investment intermediaries
and the corporations they invest in.
3. Create legal mechanisms to protect future generations.
The short-termism problem extends into our political
systems (Oxford Martin Commission 2013, 45–47). One
idea to counter short-termism in politics is to establish a
commissioner or ombud for future generations; several
countries have experimented with this idea (Weiss 2010,
110–11), which could draw on similar mechanisms for
environmental and human rights that are well developed
in many jurisdictions.13 Such an initiative could be
supplemented by broader reforms that seek to minimize
the influence of short-term political interests on government
planning and priorities. More day-to-day decision making
could be delegated to non-partisan independent agencies
(Oxford Martin Commission 2013, 58). Guaranteed term
lengths for senior administrators offer another means of
securing independence from short-term political pressure
(Oxford Martin Commission 2013, 58).
4. Rethink regulation.Much post-2008 financial regulation
has led to complicated rules breeding complicated systems,
which in turn lead to “Is it legal?” approaches that can
continue to put consumers at risk. The answer may be to
switch to coherent, concise, responsive, and enforceable
rule making that focuses on core expectations.14 Courts
will also fill gaps in redefining the roles and responsibilities
of fiduciaries. Models for “soft law,” consensual norms that
reflect “reasonable expectations” migrating into enforceable
legal standards, are rapidly evolving. The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNHCHR 2011)
and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(OECD 2011) are notable examples (see Mokhiber 2013;
see also Marotta 2013). Similar initiatives are being
launched to develop consensual norms for sustainable
financial systems.15 “Prophylactic rules” are another set of
legal mechanisms that merit consideration. Like insurance,
they are a means to respond to risks which, while uncertain
or seemingly remote, are too significant to ignore. Such
rules keep essential systems functioning while regulators
determine whether a more nuanced solution ought to be
imposed (Ford 2010, 298–99). Regulators should have
both the legal power and the confidence to impose these
kinds of mechanisms before they have complete certainty
as to the nuances of the problem.
5. Reassert the social utility of the financial sector. Current
public perceptions of this sector are dominated by lack of
understanding and lack of trust (Bowman and Rugg 2013).
While continuing to enjoy heavy public subsidies,16 the
financial sector is perceived to have massively misallocated
capital and generated suboptimal social returns. A major
campaign is needed to better explain the products, services,
and markets that help mobilize capital and price or allocate
risk in a well-functioning economy. This work is already
underway, but should be accelerated (Sandor et al. 2014;
Chong and Kleemann 2011). Likewise, regulators and
policy makers for the financial sector should convey that
financial regulation is not just about protecting consumers
from deceptive products and practices but also about
ensuring that society is well served by the financial sector
so that consumers get a “fair deal.” Public stewardship
responsibilities should be clearly articulated throughout
the financial services supply chain.17
We believe that implementing these five initiatives, taken
together, would materially raise the perception and reality
of the financial sector’s social utility around the world.
Doing the Right Thing
The trajectory of the law is clear: regulators, legislators, and
courts are expanding fiduciary duties based on reasonable
expectations that the financial sector should serve the public
interest.
The financial sector has a choice: it can continue to be reactive,
and seek to maintain an unsustainable status quo, or it can take
a proactive and collaborative approach that responds to this
rapidly emerging dynamic. The immediate consequences of
choosing the first option are already well known: more regulation
with higher compliance (and forgone opportunity) costs, higher
penalties, lower public confidence, and a less effective financial
system. The longer-term consequences, environmental and
social as well as financial, of a failure to be proactive pose
greater threats (WEF 2014, 23).
In his first economic message, Pope Francis noted that
“whatever is fragile, like the environment, is defenseless”
against markets that show a “lack of real concern for human
beings” (2013, paras. 55–56). He argued that a financial system
imbued with ethical values “would make it possible to bring
about balance and a more human social order” (2013, para. 57).
The Pope’s remarks reflect a broader current in public opinion,
a current that is increasingly reflected in the actions of regulators
and courts: the understanding that the market system has
achieved tremendous successes, and continues to have enormous
potential to serve the common good, but that this potential can
be achieved only if the financial sector is guided by a sense of
social purpose. This is the inflection point that our financial
sector will either embrace or have imposed upon it.
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Endnotes
1 This article draws from “Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for
the Financial Sector,” The Business Lawyer 69 (4), forthcoming in 2014.
We thank Keith Ambachtsheer, Jean Frijns, Jack Gray, Larry Hamermesh,
Steve Lydenberg, and Allen Willis for their helpful comments.
2 See, e.g., PBGC v Asahi Tec Corp (2013), in which the US District Court
for the District of Columbia concluded that a Japanese corporation could be
held liable for the underfunded pension liabilities of its bankrupt American
subsidiary, despite the corporation’s argument that the court lacked
jurisdiction; and Choc v Hudbay Minerals (2013), in which the Ontario
Superior Court denied a motion by Hudbay Minerals Inc. to dismiss a
claim arising from security incidents at a mine operated by its Guatemalan
subsidiary, during which one man died, another man was seriously injured,
and several women were raped.
3 Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan
Stanley, and Wells Fargo.
4 More recently, Berkshire Hathaway’s Business Wire reported that after
consultations with the New York Attorney-General’s office, it has
decided to stop giving high-speed traders direct access to news releases
(see Paterson 2014).
5 New York State Office of the Attorney General (2014); Morgenson (2014).
6 The FRC found that Deloitte had failed to manage conflicts of interest
arising from the dual role it took on as auditor to MG Rover and advisor
to a group of directors that sought to buy the company. The directors
succeeded in buying the company in 2000, but it collapsed in 2005.
7 According to the OFT report, the life-cycle effect of a 1% annual charge
can reduce retirement savings by around 20%.
8 Historically, fiduciary duties applied only to lawyers, partners, corporate
directors, and trustees. The Supreme Court of Canada has led the common-
law world in adopting a more principled approach to defining fiduciary
duties. See Guerin v The Queen (1984); Bristol & West Building Society v
Mothew (1996); and United States v Chestman (1991). The circumstances
in which a reasonable expectation that one party will act in the best interests
of the other will arise vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but most
commonly occur where such an undertaking is imposed by statute or
by agreement, or where one party seeks advice from another party on a
highly specialized field (e.g., law or medicine) in which the latter party
has expertise. See Galambos v Perez (2009, para. 84).
9 Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule, §78; Edge v
Pensions Ombudsman (1998).
10 See Withers v Teachers’Retirement System of City of New York (1978);
Varity Corp v Howe (1996).
11 See, e.g., Bennett v British Columbia (2009); BC Nurses’Union v
Municipal Pension Board of Trustees (2006).
12 The 10 Investment Beliefs adopted in fall 2013 by the California Public
Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) are illustrative, in that they
reflect an understanding of the relationship between wealth generation,
sound institutions, and a sustainable environment. For instance, Belief 2
states that “[a] long term investment horizon is a responsibility and an
advantage.” In light of this belief, CalPERS pledges to “consider the
impact of its actions on future generations of members and taxpayers,”
“favor investment strategies that create long-term sustainable value,” and
“advocate for public policies that promote fair, orderly and effectively
regulated capital markets.” Belief 9 concedes that “risk to CalPERS is
multi-faceted and not fully captured through measures such as volatility
or tracking error.” To address this, CalPERS commits to “consider risk
factors, for example climate change and natural resource availability,
that emerge slowly over long time periods, but could have a material
impact on company or portfolio returns” (CalPERS 2013).
13 One example of such a mechanism is the United Kingdom’s Sustainable
Development Commission, an independent watchdog charged with
monitoring and reporting on the government’s progress in implementing
its sustainable development strategy.
14 For example, the US Federal Reserve recently issued a statement of bank
capital planning that stipulated the need for “economically intuitive”
criteria by which directors and management are to judge actions throughout
a firm and for which they will be held accountable (Federal Reserve Board
2013, 18). Another key is to focus on emerging risks, particularly for those
most vulnerable, rather than simply responding to past failures. The US
Office of Financial Research, established under the Dodd–Frank Act to
“to improve the quality of financial data available to policymakers and
to facilitate more robust and sophisticated analysis of the financial system”
(OFR 2013), may prove a useful mechanism for promoting a more holistic,
forward looking and effective regulatory paradigm. This is a key argument
for integrated reporting – promoting a more holistic view of value creation.
15 For example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
launched such an inquiry in January 2014, aiming to identify and link a
growing number of complementary initiatives in “green” and sustainable
finance. In the same month, the Chinese Development Research Center
of the State Council launched a public inquiry on “Greening China’s
Financial System” (UNEP 2014). The leadership of emerging nations
in this area is particularly promising.
16 These subsidies come in a variety of forms, including access to subsidized
funding and regulatory entry barriers. According to one recent study, for
the 10 largest American banks, “too big to fail” status alone means benefits
equivalent to an annual subsidy of US$83 billion from taxpayers (see “Why
Should Taxpayers” 2013).
17 This concept is already being mooted by regulators. For example, US
Federal Reserve Governor Daniel K. Tarullo recently made a compelling
argument for modifying the fiduciary duties of bank directors to include
bank regulatory objectives (Tarullo 2014).
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